The burgh has been closed
Because inspiration does not need to come from grand themes, here I am reporting from the “burgh” I call the country where I live with a few updates. Some of them end up affecting me, directly or not, given my already described position as a non-citizen in this corner of the planet.
This “burgh” wants to close itself off from the rest of the world. Following the path of several other European countries, the current government — which is a minority government, but has always sought support from the far-right party whose leader was conceived in its womb and nurtured until his eventual departure from home — has been resorting to several laws to achieve this.
It began with a “foreigners” law, which is a very interesting concept for those who beat their chests and say one does not need to be native to be a citizen of this country. The law closed almost every route of entry into the country other than the prior acquisition of an entry visa. Nothing too surprising if we ignore the fact that this law also did away with some entry agreements and immigration facilities for countries of the so-called Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), which in theory had more direct routes into the country. These routes were unceremoniously shut down by the current government, which in other measures has also made life harder for those who want to stay here.
The next law dealt with making it harder to obtain Portuguese nationality. Not long ago, Portugal not only made it easier for immigrants to enter and stay in the country, but also reduced the period of residence and the criteria for granting nationality. I even thought it was an insidious measure because it came right on the heels of the increase in immigrant flows, especially Brazilians, who were no longer the old profile of people who arrived here with a good amount of money to invest in the country.
In fact, although we do not have good data to make a concrete analysis of this change in profile, it is something that can be seen anecdotally on the streets and even at the ballot box. Taking only the Brazilian sample, the vote for the Brazilian presidency from Portugal in 2018 was about 60% for the already infamous Jair Bolsonaro and the remaining 40% for the then Workers’ Party (PT) candidate, Fernando Haddad. Four years later, the scenario was completely reversed.
But why insidious? Because, whether one likes it or not, Portugal has its many historical sins. No effort has ever been made in the country to repair the damage done to the former colonies and to the populations affected by colonization itself. Could the combination of a CPLP visa plus nationality after five years of residence, basically counting time in the country whether documented or not, be seen as partially reparatory measures or not?
That was the situation until the enactment of the new nationality law a few days ago by a president recently arrived in office but who, because of his incredible inability to show any backbone in political positions, is already beginning to displease a good part of his electorate. That law was rejected by the previous president last year because of several atrocities that were, after all, unconstitutional, namely involving the creation of stateless children and other highly discriminatory issues.
Not that the second version of the law is much better. Now the deadline to obtain nationality is seven years if the person is from a CPLP country or the European Union, while everyone else has to be here for 10 years. And the time counted is only the time of “legal” stay, even though many people take years to obtain the proper residence documentation.
On principle, a president who claims to be of the “modern center-left” would have rejected the enactment of such a law. But this country being what it is, and its leaders being what they are, the lack of a spine did not keep this being’s body upright. Quite the opposite. It bent at the first wind that struck it.
But the great highlight of this whole disaster is the accessory law that dealt with the removal of nationality from those who obtained it without being a “native.” The first version, also declared unconstitutional, stated that removal would be an accessory penalty for a crime with a sentence of at least four years in prison up to 10 years after obtaining nationality, and with a very long list of crimes included. The second version, once again unconstitutional, increased the accessory penalty to five years but also the “danger” period to 15.
However, the Portuguese constitution, like so many others out there, makes no distinction between Portuguese citizens of the “first” and “second” class. I know this was a normal distinction in the past for the “returnees,” those who were removed or even expelled from the former Portuguese colonies in the 1970s and who, without Portuguese documentation, were called “second-class” citizens by the competent authorities of the time. But in a constitution written after the anti-dictatorship coup, and with a country in the midst of attempts by the far right to incite civil war, the result was a constitution that is actually quite protective of those who are Portuguese.
And so we cannot disregard the timing of this nationality law. The strongest immigration influx began in mid-2019 and continued until 2024. Beyond the already traditional immigration of people from CPLP countries, many people also came from South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. And as much as the Portuguese people I end up interacting with may have difficulty admitting it, the greatly increased presence of the latter caused a great deal of distress among the country’s population.
After all, until the end of the 2010s, Portugal did not “suffer” from immigration waves. Those who came to the country were mostly people who had facilitated routes, as was the case for citizens of CPLP countries, many of whom already had some connection to the country through friends or family. This so-called “integration,” a word so often repeated by those who consider themselves experts on the subject, was in theory facilitated by the old ties between Portugal and the Lusophone countries, however those ties were forged.
The turning point really came after the pandemic, when Portugal stood out as one of the countries with the best immigrant integration in Europe and the rest of the world. This was largely due to legislation that was much more lax regarding immigrant entry and residence than in the rest of the continent, and to the perception — at least nationally — that the country integrated those who came from abroad well.
I concede the point to those who say that the flow became excessive for the country’s capacities. Provided that one adds that such capacity was limited to the immigration agencies, which have always had major problems with management and bureaucratic flow, and eventually the bodies responsible for handling nationality applications. These did not receive the necessary support to withstand an immigration influx much larger than usual.
The truth is that, generally speaking, those who choose Portugal do not do so out of passion for the country and its history. In many cases, it is really a matter of convenience. The pre-existing ties with friends and family already living in the country, the language that creates the impression of cultural proximity between CPLP countries, the now far less present ease of immigration and of obtaining residence and nationality.
The country’s salaries are much lower than the European Union average. The sectors with the greatest job supply are low-value ones. The big cities, where the jobs actually are, are increasingly expensive to live in. And now, a population that once saw itself as so welcoming to foreigners is following exactly the opposite path.
Barring an economic revolution or the discovery of an enormous reserve of some ultra-rare and ultra-valuable resource, Portugal will not be able to escape its current economic position without an increase in technological capital and, above all, with demographics that are getting worse and worse when only the evolution of the native population is considered. The AK model of economic growth is inevitable.
Nothing prevents Portugal from having a technological boom on the back of the rest of the EU to increase its GDP above the regional average and even converge in the long term. But any technological boom needs workers to exploit that productive increase. Without these workers, the “machines” do not function and the investment is lost.
Without immigrants, Portugal’s scenario is even worse in this sense. The country loses not only working-age people today, but also future Portuguese citizens, some of whom will already be lost because of the new nationality laws, which now require children of non-natives to have Portuguese nationality only if their parents have been in Portugal for at least five years and documented, whereas under the previous law one year of residence was required regardless of bureaucratic status.
This is a topic I can explore in greater depth in the future. But demographic projections for a Portugal dependent only on its native population are absurdly negative. And the immigration specialists who supported the principle of closing the doors because of immigration “chaos” are now crying over spilled milk because the country is losing its humanitarian bent.
Once again, little did they know that impressions do not make reality. It was merely the lack of direct coexistence with non-white and non-European foreigners that created that impression. Now, with raw and real contact on the country’s streets, things change completely. The country of submission before its bosses and brutality toward its subordinates resurfaces.
This is Portugal.